The paper returns to the question whether equality in distribution is valuable in itself, or, if you like, whether it is intrinisically valuable. Its bulk is an examination of two familiar arguments against the intrinsic value of distributional equality: the levelling down objection and the objection that equality violates some person-affecting condition, in that its realisation does not improve the lot of people.
The value of equality: clarifications
Like all aspirational 3 values and ideals which have taken root in human history and acquired a wide following, the characterisation of the value or ideal of equality, or of egalitarian principles, is fluid. This is partly because the reasons which led many to a belief in equality are diverse.
And partly because as some versions of these beliefs come under criticism new versions, designed to by-pass the criticism, emerge. This process of refinement and improvement means that any hope of dealing a knock-out blow to belief in the egalitarian ideal are chimerical. No such aim is entertained for this essay. For that reason I make no attempt to provide a taxonomy of egalitarian positions, and no arguments against each one of them. My aim is to address the core view -however crudely understood -which forms one of the two main ideals of equality, the one I refer to as distributional equality.
When arguing against the validity of an ideal with deep historical roots and considerable following one needs not only to provide reasons to reject the ideal, one needs also to explain why, given its invalidity, it is so popular. The hold belief in the ideal has on people suggests that there is something to it. Perhaps it is valid after all. To establish that it is not we need to understand why its validity appears plausible. We may be prone to some reasoning fallacy leading us to endorse the ideal. But more often than not the explanation lies elsewhere. Something of real value is mistaken for the invalid ideal. I will gesture towards such an explanation below. But in the main the explanation of error is not explored here.
3
I use 'aspirational' to indicate that people have taken them to be values or ideals and aspired to see them realised, without committing to whether or not they truly were values or ideals. The focus is on reasons suggesting that there is no intrinsic value in equality. 4 We need to narrow down the issue:
1) I will consider only the non-instrumental, or, as I shall refer to it, the intrinsic, value of equality. There is no doubt that some equalities are sometimes instrumentally valuable, that they are useful for securing some valuable outcomes, or for avoiding bad ones. Often debates about the value of equality are debates about whether equality in the distribution of this or that has beneficial or adverse consequences.
But no such concerns will engage us here. 2) As mentioned this essay deals with distributive equality, that is with the possibility that there are some things such that there is intrinsic value in distributing them equally. In the history of the political and theoretical uses of 'equality' distributive equality dominates. But there is another claim: that certain creatures (people, citizens, all animals, etc.) should be treated equally. I will not consider the value of equal treatment.
3) Some writers suggest that one of these principles or ideals leads to the other, for example that the value of some form of distributive equality derives from the value of, or some principle of, equality of The instrumental will be understood broadly, to include not only the causes, but also necessary conditions for a result, in the way that the existence of gravity on our planet is a precondition for the existence of life on it. The statement applies non-vacuously only to those abilities which can develop, and whose development can be affected by educational opportunities and resources. This diagnosis of their view will be refuted or confirmed by their reaction to the following two cases: In the first case we know that at some future time Jane will be the only person alive. We can do something which will make sure that she will not be hungry. In the second case we know that at some future time both Jane and John, but no one else, will be alive. Whatever we do John will not be hungry. There is something we can do which will make sure that Jane is not hungry. In this second case we can act in order to achieve equality (in freedom from hunger), but we cannot do so in the first case, in which no distribution can be either equal or unequal. The good of avoiding hunger is achievable in both. Those who think that the reason to protect Jane from hunger in the first case is the same as the reason to protect her from hunger in the second case show in that that they take the avoidance of hunger rather than equality as the good of the distribution. So far as they are concerned the equality produced in successfully protecting people from hunger (i.e. that they 7
This need not deny that the same people will think that the two intrinsic goods are constituents of one more general good, such as happiness. There is no way of putting a precise lower limit to the importance assigned to equality by anyone who could be considered egalitarian, and no need to do so.
Needless to say egalitarianism is harder to establish and easier to refute than the thesis that some equality has intrinsic distributional
value. In what follows I will argue that equality does not have intrinsic distributional value. Given that the argument falls short of being a proof it is worth bearing in mind that whatever its force against the value of equality, it is likely to have -if at all plausible -an even greater force against egalitarianism. Given that for the most part, only egalitarians believe in the intrinsic value of equality, I will refer to any believer in the intrinsic distributional value of equality as egalitarian.
The levelling down objection
A popular argument against the value of equality, now increasingly recognised to be flawed, is known as the levelling down objection. I will consider it using a variant of the previous example:
John & Jane: Suppose that it would be good if people were equal in their possession of some good, say food. Suppose further that there are two people, Jane and John, who are not so equal, Jane having more food than John.
There are at least two ways of establishing equality of food between them. One can deprive Jane of the amount of food she has more than John, or give John that amount of food (for present purposes I will ignore the possibility of splitting the difference between them). So far as equality goes there is nothing to choose between these two ways of securing it. Practicalities aside, they are equally good or acceptable ways of achieving equality. This symmetry appears to many to be implausible.
The indifference between achieving equality by making people who are better off worse off and making people who are worse off better off appears counter-intuitive. Is not, they say, the whole point of equality to improve the lot of the deprived and the dispossessed?
Supporters of equality have, however, pointed out that the objection is invalid. It may reveal, of course, that the objectors do not really believe in the value of equality. They may simply believe in the value of alleviating poverty and deprivation. So do I, but that belief does not require commitment to the intrinsic value of distributive equality, though current Egalitarian are, by necessity pluralists about value. According to them there is value only in the distribution of something which is in itself of (some) intrinsic value, that is something whose value is independent of equality. The full proof of this is somewhat complex, and tiresome. The beginning of the proof is to note that there is no value in the equal distribution of something which is itself neither good nor bad, like the number of hairs to be found on one's shirts at any given time. To be plausible at all the value of equality must relate to the distribution of items like food, opportunities for valuable activities, freedom, and other things of value independently of their distribution. it is better to realise it without compromising the realisation of any other values rather than in ways which do compromise their realisation.
Is Equality Good for People?
The appeal of the levelling down objection may be due to failing to distinguish between it and another, more promising criticism of egalitarianism. The striking feature of egalitarianism which attracts the levelling-down objection is that according to it things are better if Jane is deprived of some of her food resources (the amount required to bring her food resources level with John's), and nothing else changes. In rebuttal it is pointed out that the premises are false. It is not true that nothing else changes. There is an additional, consequential, change, namely that equality is established. The objection fails. But, as we saw, it fails for an additional reason as well. Even if the premises were true the conclusion ('things are better …') does not follow from the premises (that depriving Jane of that amount of food will establish equality). The premises only show that things will be better regarding equality. It does not follow that they will be better overall.
Some of the objectors may persist and protest that things cannot be better in any respect if one person is worse off and no one is better off.
This claim does not vindicate the levelling down objection in any of the forms it is commonly given. But it reveals a common assumption which is not always noticed by those who share it. At its crudest it is the assumption that values are subservient to human interests. That
If realising or instantiating any putative value benefits no one, then that putative value is no value. I'll refer to that thought as the crude and simple version of the Person-affecting condition. The question is not whether realisation of equality is associated with other changes which benefit people. The question is whether equality itself benefits people. That is why the arguments turn on levelling down.
Securing equality between Jane and John by providing the latter with more food is an example of a case in which improving the lot of a person also happens to realise equality. But it is not the equality which improves his lot. It is the extra food. And the food is not necessary for the realisation of equality. Equality can be realised by denying Jane some of the food she has and wasting it. Hence the argument that equality itself not benefit them, only food provides a food-benefit. We need to ignore the coincidental benefits (where they exist) and ask whether equality itself is a benefit. How can it be? One line of thought is to draw an analogy with other 'environmental' benefits, as I will call benefits which consists in nothing more than living in a certain environment, e.g. in a beautiful mountainous valley. Just living there is a benefit. By and large such environmental benefits are recognised by people. Even those who prefer living in a big city with all its social and cultural amenities recognise that those who would rather live in the mountainous valley gain something which they lack. Nor is the benefit exhausted by the opportunities the mountain provides: opportunities to climb the peaks, to watch the birds, etc. Just living in those surroundings is of value.
So is life in a world in which distributional equality obtains a benefit to its inhabitants in a similar way? It may be helpful here to consider another example:
Galaxy: Imagine that a state of ideal equality prevails on our planet.
However, there is another planet, in a galaxy too remote for us to be able to interact with, where there are human beings living in conditions of ideal equality with each other, but whose conditions are not equal to those of people on planet earth, not equal in the respect in which equality is a good thing. The people in either planet do not know of the existence of the other, nor can they find out (given the laws of nature).
Bertie is one of those people. He lives on earth. Back to Galaxy. If Bertie benefits from the equality which came to reign in the world it is not because he experiences it. So if establishing equality benefits him that is because the value of equality can benefit people in other ways as well. I do not know of any explanation of the way equality with the remote planet can benefit people which would apply to Bertie. I will therefore assume that it does not.
It does not follow, however, that equality is not an environmental value. Think of beautiful landscapes again. There may be beautiful landscapes on some uninhabited planets. They are still beautiful even though they never did, nor ever will, benefit anyone. In general the value of anything of value does not disappear when it does not benefit anyone.
War and Peace would remain a good novel even if people were to read it no more, and forget that it exists. The person-affecting condition does not stipulate that every instance of a value actually benefits someone or other. It merely states that
Person-affecting condition (first approximation): If V is a value (a value property) then it is possible for some of its instantiations to benefit people.
One aspect of the rationale for the person-affecting condition should be noted here. Insisting on the condition implies that in some, yet to be explained, way the point of intrinsic values is that people should relate to them in appropriate ways. Values provide reasons, and, metaphorically speaking, they are unfulfilled or wasted if those reasons are not conformed to. Our current concern is that while any instantiation of a value is an instantiation of a value regardless of whether or not anyone can benefit by it, the stringency or importance of the reasons we may have to realise the value on a particular occasion, or to preserve its instances, will depend on the benefit it brings to people. Therefore, while possibly the equality of the conditions of people on Earth and on the remote planet is valuable, the person-affecting condition implies that there is little reason to bring it about or preserve it if it already exists, as this particular instantiation of equality cannot benefit anyone.
But the question remains whether under some circumstances living in conditions of equality benefits people, and I will now assume that if it does that is due to their experiences of equality, or of the egalitarian aspect of life in conditions of equality. But what is that experience?
The problem with Galaxy is not merely that Bertie does not know of the remote planet, but that even if he did its existence is unlikely to yield any relevant experience of either equality or inequality. He may be pleased or displeased to know of the inequality and the subsequent equality in conditions of life between Earth and that planet, but that is not enough to establish that Equality meets the person-affecting condition. Perhaps the egalitarian experience relates to the experience of living in a community in which equality prevails. I do not mean a particularly small or cohesive community. Any social environment living in which is intrinsically meaningful (for good or ill) will do.
There are two difficulties in understanding the intrinsic value of equality in this way, that is understanding it as a value which benefits people who live in societies in which equality prevails through experiencing the egalitarian character of these societies. Arguably distributional equality is a precondition of various desirable effects. Perhaps without it conflict within communities is inevitable. Perhaps without it people are unlikely to be infused with concern for all, and would not pursue the common good as they ought Applied to equality the condition says that equality is of intrinsic value only if it can benefit people, and that condition is not toothless. In fact, the previous section has established that equality fails this test, and can therefore have no intrinsic value.
